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An Invitation

Dear Reader,

You are about to read a logbook of an .excursion through
territory that may at first seem quite familiar. Before long,
however, you may begin to wonder where you are and where the
road is going. Perhaps a few signposts may relieve your
uncertainty. Let me begin with my conclusion: Religion is more
of a mosaic than a simple picture created by one artist. Actually
this final judgment depends on other notions met along the way.
There are two such:

1. That religion is not one homogeneous enterprise.
2. If that is so, we are in a good position to
appreciate my basic "argument." We can now
look for religion on what I call the "human
continuum," and that is where this excursion is
taking us.
But, why now? Because we live now in a culture in which
we cannot avoid the power and presence of the "scientific
method." Finding religion on the ''human continuum" means
simply that it is-pardon the repetition--a human phenomenon.
In my judgment, however, this does not diminish the necessity
and the power of religion. Rather, it allows us to extend the
boundaries of our humanity.
For now it is clear that human beings have the
opportunity of living in at least three dimensions:

1. Individual human beings have physical bodies:
biological marvels that organize star dust into
amazing sentience.

2. We have mental worlds in which we can take off
on unpredictable adventures-creating ourselves
and our histories
3. And we have, as aspects of those mental worlds,
imaginations that can see and know realities that
are both invisible and intelligible.
Eventually, I tell myself, in order to climb the "Mount
Everest of Religion" we need folks whose lives are lived on that
"continuum" and are willing and able to assist in the climb
toward the peak of that mountain. Still, I shall not be surprised if
the "argument" of this book may seem more personal than you
expected. I shall acknowledge, a little later, that "wherever one
stands one occupies a position inside a worldview as well as
inside the cosmos ... " We all explore the universe while
occupying some place in it. I am willing to allow that this quasi
confession applies to the author and accounts for, at least the
appearance of, his being personal while he tries to find his way
into the cosmos where we all ''live and move and have our
being." To give the reader a choice I launch these essays with an
Invitation from within a worldview where I venture to explore, if
not the cosmos, then at least a tender piece of the behavior of a
small part ofthe inhabitants ofthat cosmos.
The purpose of the stream of essays that follows is not to
disparage religion nor to persuade adherents of particular
traditions or those drawn to "religion in general" that they are at
table with a Feast of Fools. It is to make the case that religion,
like so many other personal experiences and components of
culture, is a more complex and interesting reality than it seems
to be in the realm of ordinary public discourse. Even its location
and function in a cultural matrix cannot be accounte<l, for by a
single "cause," whether supernatural, psychological, or historical.
Any and all religious traditions bear the marks of their location,
their cultural context, their place in a historical epoch, their
psychological and social effects, their intellectual content, their
2
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personal satisfactions, and their interpretation by gifted or
desperate individuals.
Religion is no less complicated a perspective on life,
person'\! or collective than, for example, the economy or a
prevailing political system. I suspect that any and all such
entanglements of our common "forms of life" lead often to a
singular human moment. Sooner or later we discover the one
reality that defines the human species on this planet: our
mortality.
And if nothing else, religious behavior eventually
hits that wall and either climbs over it with ingenious athleticism
or falls back in at least temporary despair.
For the contemporary atheists, it seems, our mortality is
the singular fact that defines our humanity. For those who deny
any superordinate reality there is no future beyond our human
careers so there was no past that inflicted on us an unjust finale
to our existence. I want to argue, however, that it is the
ingenious "fictions of coherence" (more on this later) that the
religious imagination conjures to cope with the despair that
atheists prefer to ignore.
Here I must protest that the atheists' polemics do not
"prove" that the conjurations of the religious imagination lack all
existential value. Religious experience and historical traditions
are not false or useless simply because the rhetoric that expresses
them is not "objective."
Edwin Dobb (a former editor of The Sdences) offers the
following critique of objectivity: "... wherever one stands one
occupies a position inside a worldview as well as inside the
cosmos, creatures of a two fold creation." 1 He goes on to refine
this observation: "Despite claims to objectivity, physics [with the
other sciences] is a sophisticated, highly specialized attempt to
humanize the world." 2 Finally, with a touch of ambiguity, he
assures us that the human story assumes the shape oflonging.
Human longings, however are not uniform. Neither the
subjectivist nor the objectivist can claim exclusive certainty for
their truths. These excursive essays, like all human efforts, are
essays-attempts-toward appreciating the ambiguity of the
brain/mind's ingenuity in simply making sense of the parade of
3

perceptions, the swarm of ideas, the circus of hopes that define
our responses to the uncertainties, the ambiguities that drive us
into our human futures.
As I suggested above, religious
experience and historical traditions are not false or useless
simply because the rhetoric that expresses them is not
"objective."
Now I must protest further that I do not have any
intention to defend religion either as a historical or a
psychological phenomenon. Its persistence in varied versions of
reimagining our world may tempt the philosopher and the
scientists to attack or defend it. Neither response to finding
religion "alive and well" and proliferating or evolving or
withering away has any appeal for me. I take "religion" as a
given in the global environment, making its appearance on the
double stage of history and nature, as both personal experience
and as complex traditions. Such traditions provide "fictions of
coherence" that are embedded between human consciousness
and the curious imagination. Here we find mind negotiating
with brain in order to prompt humans to live into their futures
while holding onto and imagining pictures of the world that
contain traces from the past or expectations of a fluid present.
I am tempted to end this invitation with an analogy-a
parable-of how humans struggle to balance the temptation as
participants and as observers in the ordinary course of living.
Take Soccer as an instance. There is, of course, the International
Game that we can observe on the great pitches where pros play
The Game. But then, there is the "home team," that draws us in
as participants-not actually in uniform kicking the ball, but still
as emotionally and in our imagination "playing" the local version
ofthe Game of Games. Religion is the same kind ofreality. We
can watch it and we can "play" it. My strategy in this book is to
appreciate the ambiguity and at the same time try to describe it
as both a universal in human history and an experience that
engages us as individuals. It is both an objective and a 41Ubjective
phen?menon. Certain aspects of religion satisfy complex needs
and desires of human individuals and at the same time enable us
to live as members of the human race. Our understanding of
religion is best realized when we concede that it is not a simple
4

homogeneous phenomenon. Today it is for any one of us an
opportunity to be part of whatever it is; tomorrow it may occupy
our consciousness as The Game of Games.
~
Por a moment let me shift the metaphor from gameoriented to a trip through unfamiliar territory. As we try to
understand the phenomenon of religion, we should be aware of
how we travel through its territory. As we maneuver our way
through this wonderful, varie.d world of ideas and experience, we
surely must notice-as participants-that for us humans, religion
maintains a narrative of ancient memories that tempt us to
interpret life as a reassurance that the universe is ultimately both
a safe place to live and at the same time promises a destiny that
transcends human mortality. In short, for participants-whether
as solo individuals or as adherents of a historic communityreligion is the repository of fictions and wisdom that persuade us
that existence makes sense-and constrains us to certain
behaviors both as individuals and as participants in social
processes.
Those in the mode of observers, on the other hand, may
maintain a degree of detachment that spares them such
opportunities. Religion for them is more or less uncomplicated
by doubts and uncertainties, as well as prospects of
transcendence-of communion with what is other than life on
Monday morning.
So these experiential modes tell us that there are at least
two perspectives on the same thing. There are those persons
involved in religion as an ineluctable presence, a complex and
varied phenomenon, a multi-faceted mosaic rather than a stone
wah that ·invites collision. Then there are the observers for
whom religion is what preoccupies those who dream, at best
hopefully, of what lies beyond the ordinary and prompts
unfulfillable hopes of an existence that only seems to go beyond
Monday morning.
Perhaps it comes down to this: For the participant
religious experience hears the echo of the universe 3, for the
observer there is at most the sound oflife in the ordinary.
5

The person addressing the reader values with some
reluctance both perspectival modes, confident, however, that
religion is not a single homogeneous enterprise, rather a carillon ·
than a single bell. This book tries to appreciate this ambiguity.
To accomplish this, I begin by supposing that the
question, ''Is that all there is?" offers an otherwise self-satisfied
imagination an open playing field.
Then I allow two
contemporary poets to test the limits of such a rhetorical
question.
While still confronting our inability-or hesitancy-to
resolve the question, I venture to challenge what I can only call
the belief paradigm that provides the rhetorical gestures of
ordinary religious discourse. In the place of this habit of mind, I
argue that it is (special) human relationships that persuade us to
launch further inquiry and continue to navigate the waters of
what we too easily call religious experience.
Of course, that experience in one way or another must
allow us to cope with or casually invoke the concept of a
superordinate reality into the struggle for certitude as we face a
world crying out to be understood as our primary dwelling place.
Then at last, I assemble an array of interpretive ideas
under the figure of a Mosaic. The point of this strategy is to
allow that religion (as, for example, the economy) is not a single
homogeneous enterprise. As phenomenon, religion exhibits a
subtle variety of effects on the course of our human lives. We
can only begin to appreciate these effects by confronting
religion's practical ambiguity: The adherents of religious
traditions must face their existential reality and manage their
penchant to confront ''the Wholly Other" (quite often, simply
"God") while creating and maintaining their identity as human
beings.
In this effort to resolve religion into its various aspects I
also propose that its most energetic facet is what ...I call its
Wel~bild An easier, though less precise term would be its "world
picture," that is, how one sees--how one contemplates--his or her
world.
6

My best hope is that these excursions will both preserve
and refme this pervasive reality that haunts our minds, consoles
our emotions, and allows us to appreciate-sometimes casually,
other t.Unes with serious intensity-at least something of the
mystery of our humanity.
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Chapter One
A Question Shall Lead Us
''Is that all there is?"
(Peggy Lee, 1969)

In our time, it seems, religion suffers a crisis of identity.
It no longer has a consistent referent in the arena of public
discourse. The shadow that it casts in history depends on a host
of variables. Is it a personal experience; is it a communal
phenomenon? A flood of natural and temporal circumstances, it
seems, obscures the track it leaves along the course of human
history.
Can we name it as though it were a singular
phenomenon? Does it claim its right to be what it is or do its
human adherents define it as they use it for uncertain purposes?

Madeline Albright, in her book The Mighty and the
Almighty, struggling in the face of the "East-West" encounters of
religious traditions, finally acknowledges, 'The years have not
brought me certainty about religion." 1 Then in a confessional
moment, she asserts, ''I am a hopeful Christian [She was born
Jewish and raised Catholic.] but an inadequate one, with doubts. I
respect other religions because I think they are reaching for the
same truth, though from a different angle." 2 Such a statement, of
course, exhibits perhaps more confusion about "religion" than
bon tide understanding.
I begin with Madeline Albright's reflections, however,
because they are current and offered by a person in the public
arena. I cite them also because they reflect the uncritical
perspective of Gandhi and others whose interests are more
political than philosophical. It is really the statement, "The years
have not brought me certainty about religion," that piques my
frustration. If one tunes into the public discourse about religion
9

it is clear that such a statement should be made by most
journalists as well as so-called pundits. But it is the philosopher
in me that has grown weary of the rhetorical reflexes in all such
talk about religion. This unrelenting stream of talk about
religion provokes in me despair at refining the rhetoric that
scrambles religion, faith, belief, spirituality, and other
conventional terms as though their referents were consistent
with each other and generally agreed upon. I am sure that other
concepts suffer from the same casual usage. Consider the
ambiguity of such notions as "the economy," "art," "politics,"
"culture," and the like when they appear in public talk. I leave it
to others to venture to bring such notions under critical scrutiny.
My choice is to run against the stream of talk about religion,
trying to introduce at least a modicum of consistency. It is
tempting also to try to restore an appreciation of this complex
phenomenon that seems so simple when it enters the realm of
public discourse.
This motive is justified especially when we observe what
happens when that old encounter between religion and science
appears on the scene. According to the court transcript of the
2004 trial on teaching "intelligent design" in biology courses in
the Dover, Pennsylvania public schools, a significant amount of
time was given to "defining" science. No comparable effort was
given to "defining" religion; a commonsense, conventional,
uncritical under-standing of religion pervaded the testimony.
So it is with great sympathy and tolerance that I observe,
in the context of Albright's rumination, that there is seldom any
effort to deal critically with the .disparities between the rhetoric
of religious traditions and the multi-faceted reality that swings
steadily between the personal and the institutional, between the
historical and the transcendental, between the fictional and the
verifiable. It is the unresolved dualistic bias, overriding critical
reflections, that more often · than not shapes and defines
"religion" in the public realm. The result, personal "~fmitions"
of Eeligion displace, by default, any attempt at critical
understanding. And why not? What I believe is what I believe
and others do or should believe as well. As we shall see, it is the
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very notion of ''belief' in most religious discourse-as well as
discourse about religion-that creates an aura of ambiguity.
In search of some road to clarity with regard to religion,
Perhaps with a "scientific"
then, ~here should we start?
observation. Like certain kinds of trees religion has the
capability to self-hybridize, that is, to create variants of itself that
are distinctive. So, when we approach the fact of religion, we
should be prepared to find a "vital" reality that requires ingenuity
to understand. From this perspective, religion requires an
approach that does not call on a simple or singular philosophical
viewpoint.

"Religion," then, has entered the realm of public
discourse as an objective dynamic while at the same time it
preoccupies individuals as subjective experience. Surely such a
phenomenon should be approached with more curiosity than
certainty. If we insist on being philosophical in our approach, we
should let the reality of the thing advise us how we might
appreciate it.
We should suppose, then, that the phenomenon of
religion is not only something in itself but also involves real
persons in subjective experience-whether one's own or that of
others. So, when we observe religion in all of its objectivity, we
must be ready to meet it on its own terms. This means, but only
in part, that we must be prepared to encounter the presumed
Other that haunts religion's own history and haunts the human
psyche as well. Religion, however we define it, presents us with
the shadow of god, a superordinate being or beings-though this
reality is, in human terms, overwhelmed by other aspects of
experience that allow (or require) the adjective "religious."
Hence we should have at our disposal a variety of tools that
permit not only dissection but also excavation, not only
understanding but also appreciation. For the best outcome of
this inquiry, then, we should probe both for "religion's" essence
and manifestation as we encounter its immediate reality in
history and personal experience. 3
Religion for the philosopher, then, is not simply game to
be hunted for a trophy, nor merely a greenhouse of orchids to be
11

admired for their idiosyncratic charm. It is rather like an entire
ecosystem in which life evolves through time. We must be
prepared to encounter religion in its several aspects, entangled in
the modalities of human behavior and thought as well as in the
political and social processes that preoccupy human beings
wending their way through history.
In order to appreciate the rich ambiguity of "religion"
that is given to any philosophical venture, let us acknowledge the
conundrum that religious traditions confront: Who among us
knows enough to solve the mystery that infuses our many efforts
to know who we are, what we are and where we are? On the
other hand who among us knows enough to be absolutely certain
that we do not know enough to answer those questions?

Perhaps if we place ourselves at the intersection of
certainty and uncertainty, setting aside belief as not much more
than subjective illusion, a stopgap that simply holds off
confusion and any need to deal carefully with the ambiguities
embedded in such utterances as Madeline Albright's, we would
recognize the basis for both the existential and metaphysical
versions of these questions. There may be, however, an easier
way to extricate ourselves from sue~ a philosophical tangle. The
clue to this prospect may lie in a quite unexpected moment.
When I first heard it evoked in a casually "philosophical"
conversation, the refrain of a popular song was introduced in the
give and take and immediately reverberated in my
consciousness: "Is that all there is?" I had no idea of the source of
that exclamatory question.
It turns out that it was a rhetorical question in the refrain
of a popular song sung by Peggy'Lee in 1969. Even before the
version by Peggy Lee, however, there is evidence that the
question was inspired by the 1896 story, Dissillusionment by
Thomas Mann, adapted by Leiber and Stoller and broadcasted in
San Francisco in 1964. Still more recent evidenco.. of how
tempting the question is can be found in the The New Yorker,
August 15, 2012. James Wood, a critic at large, wrote an essay
Secula.rism and its Discontents and entitled it, "Is That All There
Is?"
12

This unanswerable - rhetorical - question jolted my
rational imagination and took me beyond the Peggy Lee song
itself. I need not quote the lyrics but the refrain itself should
provide 4 basis for what I offer here as an apologia. By that I
intend an explanation that warrants the use of the question in a
critical task that may exceed the lyrics and the music of a "pop
song."
In one verse, after reil,liniscing about a house fire and a
visit to the circus, she remembers a love affair some time in her
life. Soon into the memory she recalls the moment: Her love
went away abruptly and the surge of longing and fear hit her,
"and I thought I would die," but she didn't. Then in a poignant
philosophical moment she sang:

Is that all there i~ is that all there is?

ffthat's all there i~ my fiien~ then Jet's keep dancing.

4

Epiphanies of the dancing mind that come unbidden still
might focus thoughts otherwise blurred or obscure. I ventured
to myself: Perhaps religious experience may be nothing moreor nothing less-than the erie de cour in moments when reason
and emotion are fully, mysteriously compatible; when insights
create themselves out of immediate experience and the mind
pirouettes with itself responsive, perhaps, to the music of the
spheres.
Dare I discern such thoughts in the lyrics of what seems a
casual refrain in a poptilar song: "Is that all there is?" At such a
moment the mind may fall back upon itself and from that
subjective platform realize, whether desperately or ecstatically,
that the question being asked opens doors upon inner and outer
worlds.
Still, the question is what it is. With this and countless
other human utterances, one may claim the privilege of making
it one's own. We 'then have a question, whatever its origin, that we
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need not refuse, however faintly it may reverberate in the
channels of a questing mind.
This apologia is not simply a condescending gesture that
says, "I'm sorry that you don't hear what I hear." It is rather a
"word" to ward off misunderstanding, a reassurance that justifies
a use that may not be immediately obvious. "Is that all there is?"
In whatever other contexts it may have emerged, whatever the
reasons for an original experiential moment, the question may
carry the imagination beyond a casual state of complacency into
unexplored territory of thought and intuition. Is it fair to talk
about philosophical opportunism? Well, Peggy Lee and those
others who raised it, whatever their personal intentions, have
given us a bona fide opportunity to wax reflective.
I was slightly relieved of any further worry when I found
a reference to a song by Bob Dylan in a book with a clearly
philosophical bias. Jennifer Hecht, in her book Doubt: A History,
invokes a popular folk singer as a source for authentic
philosophical reflection. I'll let the context justify the invocation
of Dylan's song:
Another huge difference between our human world and
the universe as we know it is that, within the human
world, as Bob Dylan sings, "Everybody's got to serve
somebody." 5
The serious "argument" expressed in the verse is that ''We are all
inferior to someone in some areas." How many other unexpected
sources may there be to guide one's reflection on life-or on
religion? Is it too much to hqpe that, buried in unexpected
places, we might find useful insights?
"Is that all there is?" The reflective person may recognize
here the great conundrum that philosophers have never fully
resolved. What is the relation of how things appear
._ and how
things are? Kant's distinction still haunts rational discourse: The
distinction between phenomenal and noumenal reality. What
things seem to be and what things are "in reality''? But one need
not be the philosophical type to appreciate the confusion that
14

observatioh elicits. The cliche that so bothered Longfellow, by no
means beholden to the likes of Kant, is not idle rhetoric:

Tell me not in moumful numbe~
Lite is but an empty dream!
For the soul is dead that slumbers.,
And things are not what they seem.

6

Is it mere superstition or legitimate suspicion that "things
are not what they seem"? The poet seems quite unwilling to
concede the truth of this maxim. Even ordinary experience
raises the specter of uncertainty. "Is that all there is?" Our
wandering or preoccupied minds need not go too deep into
immediate experience or too far into the imagined array of
galaxies to stumble onto this query. The human imagination at
its most vulnerable may still suspect that it is constantly rubbing
up against only the veneer of reality. The actual seems
con'cealed at least in part by a shadow. It is the great paradox of
the indigenous tradition ofJapan that the living Kami in a Shinto
shrine is revealed most clearly by being hidden in the semidarkness of the inner sanctum. The ordinary mind may be
restless until it finds some presumed rest in a divine presence. It
is tempting to suppose, however, that such a presence is an
illusion conjured by our desire to catch a glimpse of the ultimate
panorama or to relieve the immediate pain of some vague
uncertainty. One way or another, we cannot finally suppress the
question, "Is that all there is?" May I risk at least the suggestion
that it is a version of the "ultimate question" that sets the stage
for religious experience in the sprawling array of religious
traditions?
Which brings us to the gateway guarded by those two
sentinels of the philosophical enterprise. There at the entryway
to the labyrinth within the Great Labyrinth, Question guards the
answers and Answer guards the question. In the hallway beyond
the entry we meet the twin couple Uncertainty and Certainty.
Under their direction we meet two other guests, Mind and World,
15

inviting us to tour the universe that is our sometime home,
determined to discover a "homology between heavenly and
earthly events." 7
Enough now of this rhetorical excess! Philosophy, not
allegory, is the work at hand. Such work, however, need not lead
us to the Museum of Philosophy and its docent whose only
interest is history. There, it is true, in dimly lighted rooms we
may contemplate what some philosophers have done, but we
should also realize what any of us might do in sustained
moments of curiosity and reflection.
Try thinking of philosophers as swimmers in the Ocean
of Reality.
In moments of panic-or in the throes of
uncertainty-what might a swimmer do, especially when the
waves threaten to pull him under or sweep him away? A choice,
I think, presents itself when the philosopher-swimmer confronts
"religion" disguised as the presumptive Answer to questions that
threaten to overwhelm his casual breaststroke. It is also possible
that "religion" may draw us to the shore of an unexplored land;
only to strand the swimmer in a world he imagined he was
struggling to transcend.
Against the background of such uncertainty I shall not
presume to explain the phenomenon of Religion. I prefer rather
to evoke an appreciation for this two-edged experience. The
questions that follow take us in that direction. They cover a wide
array of what the religion is that inhabits a privileged place on
the human continuum. I am sure there are more than five that
may help us chart the religious adventure of the human species.

1. Are its roots experiential or noetic?
Religious folks can hardly resist presuming certain
knowledge. Surely experience tempts us at least to hope that
our minds are not simply adrift in a sea of final un't:ertainty.
Feeling; imagination~ intuition~ even guesses add up to a
sense of being somewhere and sometime in the universe.
16

Even temporality offers us some sense ofnoetic potency. We
know we are histOiy.
~

2. Is revelation a subjective or an objective event? Or is a
claim for "revelation" necessary to other religious
claims or experience?
We can hardly resist "connecting the dots» of experience.
Our subjectivity is resdessly determined that we live in a
world that is at least hopef'ul, ifnot certain~ about being in an
intelligible universe. There is alwa~ fOr human beings, a
mental wind blowing back the veil ofignorance.

3. Are religious traditions radically idiosyncratic or do
they tend toward universality?
There are two pathways through this conundrum. Evezy
religious tradition has its own integrity; origin and
configuration. It is distinctive if not unique. Personal
experienc~ on the other hand, often finds it impossible to
resist the notion of a universal way of being human. We
suppose we are all on pathways that eventually converge. We
also can hardly resist an unceitain confidence that the course
oflife is teleologically 8 determined Or is it?

4. Is there a common psychological template for the
varieties of religious experience or does it depend on an
individual's location in time and place?
MysticS; neurologists and psychologists wresde with this
puzzle. Certain philosophers have also thrown their hats into
the ring. But when you assemble the variety of religious
traditions that have smfaced in the course ofhuman history.
one can hardly expect to make the case that Japanese Shinto
17

and Chinese ConfUcianism are based on a single version of
universal "spirituality." But among the monotheisms,
including Zoroastrianism and the Solar religion ofEgypt, it is
easier to describe the systematic and imaginative differences
among them. And then there are the religious traditions of
what we now group together as belonging to "indigenous
folks." "Where in such a 'template" would we find the
beginnings of the Dreamtime of the Australian aborigines?
But even though the psychological template might elude
research, it seems to me presumptuous to say that there may
not be some commonality overarching the historical
differences.

5. Is religion primarily a social phenomenon or does it
originate in solo moments and then ineluctably tempt
others to imitate it-however imperfectly?
I am tempted to take shelter in a paradox: Religious
traditions may have their beginning often enough in the
experience of specific individuals, but given the universal
human impulse to find others with whom to share work and
feelings, what eventually emerges at specific times and places
are traditions as social phenomena. But it would be reckless
to insist that there can be no examples of bona fide solo
religious experience.
There is virtually no end to the string of queries that
enmesh "religion" as reflective :Quman beings observe it. When
one is drawn into the web, the strands proliferate in a wondrous
tangle that could easily discourage further inquiry. Still the
weave taunts us to tease it apart-or perhaps tempts us to cut the
Gordian knot with whatever tool might be at hand. Surely,
however, we cannot gainsay the fact of religion, even 'tf we sense
how: fragile and varied a fact it is. Fact? Yes, even though we
might argue that it often plays fast and loose with many other
facts of the world in which we find it.
18

The dilemma deepens in the presence of this
phenomenon that we should reflect upon. What, in fact, does one
reflect on when religion becomes an object of inquiry or
contem~ation?
Such reflection necessarily requires binocular
vision. When one thinks about religion one ipso filcto thinks
about oneself as much as she thinks about the world in which
both reflect each other? But whatever the motive or method, the
goal is clear: To appreciate the complexity of this "simple"
reality that haunts history and the mind that contemplates that
reality.
After many years of reflecting on "religion"-both as
experienced and as observed, both as felt reality and as
phenomenon-! venture to exercise candor and at the same time
maintain a degree of intellectual integrity. How may I maintain
such a balance? Shall I presume to explain the phenomenon or
shall I presume to justifY the experience? Surely it is possible to
defme the term and to elucidate the concept without performing
a dissection that leaves the real thing dismembered and (maybe)
lifeless?
This is not an idle question, given the attention now being
directed by neuroscience even to questions about religion.
Among all the critics that I might invoke to throw light on this
trend, Gary Greenberg puts himself in the middle of this version
of the business of science. The question he wrestles with is
"Where is the you in the you when the brain is subjected to
neurological examination and explanation?" 9
In more
conventional terms, where is that part of this person (me or you)
that is capable of some presumed religious experience?
Imagining that (distant?) day when neuroscience has charted and
excavated the brain and discovered the mind in that organismand the seat of transcendence, if such there is-Greenberg
laments the consequences:
Of course, I think my grandchildren . . . will be
missing out on something . . . . And if I complain out
loud to the whippersnappers [read, neuroscientists]
whose brains will no doubt have been trained and
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bettered and perhaps even perfected, the loss I will
regret the most is the uncertainty, the not knowing how
the mind emerges from the brain, and the teasing
possibility that there is something else lurking among
my molecules. 10
Mind I Brain I Religion: Should we trust a scientific
explanation of that triad? And if "religion" is a function of
(depends on) the organic mind/brain singularity, would it not
tempt us to consider "religion" a neurological condition-and
even, perhaps, pathological-especially given the historical
behavior of some religious folks? Is it possible (as certain
contemporary atheists insist) that religion is indeed a sickness of
the human species? But how many doctors have presumed to
treat this, ailing patient-if in fact it is ailing? How many
shamans have attempted to revive the moribund client? How
many priests have celebrated its vitality? Many, of course, would
deny that religion requires any treatment at all, while others
would insist that it is time to let it go the way of other relics of
the desperate human imagination. Of course, there are also
those whose lives would wither on the vine if they felt their
religion dissolving into modernity.
The phenomenon of religion, however, is not exhausted
by personal experience. It is also the context of serious truth
claims.
Even then the question pushes our minds and
imaginations: Is the Truth of religion revealed or is it as much a
conjuration of human ingenuity as any other system that
interprets and enables human experience? But perhaps religion
is as much an effect of human culture as, for example, is "the
economy"-or are both a priori realities that are themselves
causes of historical cultures? Does the human imagination
create religion or does religion force the human mind to imagine
a world-or rather a picture of a world-ofmultiple vistas?
From what vantage point do we best unddlstand the
oce8J1 of religion? From the wet sands at the edge of the ocean or
while breasting the waves that at once hold us up and threaten to
overwhelm us? Do we appreciate the song of religion by singing
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it or hearing it; is it best to be part of the chorus or to take the
podium to direct it? How does being "religious" enable or shape
our relationship with the world whose picture we harbor ii'l our
imaginatJ.cms?
In the essay by Edwin Dobb cited earlier we find insights
that add an extra dimension to this question. Dobb reminds us
that: "Precisely when we grasp the vastness of the universe we
also glimpse an equally vast interior." 11 The philosopher
especially should be sensitive to this exercise of the "binocular
mind" that we may not even recognize: The mind that sees the
world while it sees itself seeing that world. More often than not
ordinary experience does not force any such realization upon us.
Still the mind cannot avoid the dilemma that catches us in the
web of uncertainty when we confront the universe with any hope
of a perfectly clear picture that satisfies both our reflex
subjectivity and our desperate effort at objectivity.
Dobb
ingeniously discovers the limits to perfect understanding that
may disconcert some of us, at least as we seek religious insight
without turning our backs on the scientific culture. We should
let him say it once more:
We now know that we do not occupy the center of the
universe, but we sometimes forget that we will always
stand at the center of our picture of the universe. 12
Eventually the web of questions, the tangle of alternatives
may induce either fatigue of reason or weariness of spirit.
Neither cognitive anodyne nor a sleeping potion for the soul
gently relieve the pain or turmoil of inquiry. Nor can the will
itself easily determine that we simply walk away., The ghosts of
worry and doubt haunt some of us while awake or asleep, while
hope wrestles with the irrepressible desire for certitude. We
witness the strange, improvised dance of Doubt and Belief, while
knowledge taunts faith and religion begins to shimmer like a
phantasm ofthe imagination and then perhaps comes into focus
as a solid reality that only a fool would risk denying.
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As modems forget to remember what they once were, the
primitive and unsophisticated perhaps never forget what they
remember. "Religion" is a habit of mind for most of us and a
thorn in the flesh for many others. It is more often a reality that
most cannot deny-as well as an illusion that many want not to
be lured by.
When it surfaces in public discourse, is the occasional
denial of religion simply a negative preference? But why should
a mere personal preference against religion be justified over
against the evidence of religion's persistence as a historical
phenomenon? If we were to take a poll on the question, "Is
religious truth a reality in the cosmos?" the number of "yeas"
would surely swamp the "nays." So what? Is the reality of a
world dependent on the agreement of opinions for or against its
reality?
If these meandering thoughts seem tedious, I can only
say that I speak here and now. My ruminations are provoked by
the voice of public discourse as well as by the private voices of
piety and belie£ Religion is perhaps no longer what it was;
though there are many who are desperate to preserve it for what
they presume (or remember) it was. Of course, it still is what it
was and at the same time it is becoming something else-though
perhaps the "something else" is at least an aspect of what it
always was.
Is the ambiguity that I have just rehearsed only self-

inflicted? Or is it a bona fide response to current culture?
Should we not simply respect the aura of other-worldliness that
accompanies every and all religions? But is it not that very aura
that provokes us in the here and now to recognize the confusion
of our situation? The canons of scientific knowledge are devoid
of other-worldliness. 12 Still, the skeptic may ask, "Are we human
beings inescapably denizens of only the natural world?" Is there
nothing else even in our humanity that lures the natural mindin both its rational and imaginative modes-to con,emplate a
"something" or "somewhere" beyond itself? The question again
springs to the surface: "Is that all there is?"
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The question snares us in a dilemma: Not even our most
intense contemplation of the beyond necessarily convinces the
universe to be what we suppose it is. Does our thinking actually
mock t~ cosmos or does the cosmos mock our thinking?
Perhaps religion really is an opiate, an illusion or, worse, no more
than a decoration that we admire only because we contrived it. Is
it a poetic expression of personal experience or a final word
spoken by the "Wholly Other," disguised as prophet or mystic?
But suppose we had never indulged ourselves in such a
habit of mind. Would it then be necessarily true that there is
nothing for us not to contemplate? Is it possible that Piet Rein's
conundrum reflects the truth both of human thought and of the
world it addresses:

A bit beyond perception's reach
I sometimes believe I see
That life is two locked boxes,
Each containing the other's key.

13

Quietly I hear reason scratching at the wall of what may
be its own prison. It seems to be saying to itself: "I should stop
now. This prison is only my natural self and that self is what I
am, though haunted by a beyond that I conjure with a certainty
that I have discovered what really exists." But there is another
ghost that whispers, "Believe that what you believe is true, for
why would you believe what is not true." Still a third ghost stirs
its sheets and talks back, "You know in your heart of hearts that
your reason is ingenious enough to fool itself with its own
beliefs. It can conjure knowledge that persuades itself of its own
certainty-and hence can entertain beliefs that may not be true,
while at the same time struggling to reconcile itself to its own
limits."
Perhaps, after all, the "beyond" that tempts human
experience is both a subjective and an objective reality. And the
pendulum of thought measures time, but only within eternity
and alludes to eternity from among the interstices of time. Is it
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possible that the beyond is within and that same pendulum of
thought measures itself while it maintains itself with the hope
that it participates in eternity?
Having woven this web too tightly, I should now venture
a coda that may take us to the real starting point of my
ruminations. We shall begin our last moments at a well's edge
with Robert Frost, whom Mark Van Doren called "a philosophical
poet" whose "profound and delicate heart was joined to an
intellect which never ceased to search for the ultimate meaning
oflife." 14

For Once, Then, Something
Others taunt me with having knelt at well-curbs
Alwap wrong to the light; so never seeing
Deeper down in the well than where the water
Gives me back in a shining surface picture
Me myselfin the summer heaven, godlike,
Looking out ofa wreath offern and doud puffs.
Once, when trying with chin against a

well-cur~

I discerne4 as though, beyond the picture,
'Iflrough the picture, a something white, uncertain,
Something more ofthe depths-and then I lost it.
Water came to rebuke the too dear water,
One drop fell nom a fern, and lo. a ripple
Shook whatever it was lay there at bottom

.

Blurred it; blottedit out. What was that whiteness?
Truth? A pebble ofquartz? For once, then, something.

15

In the well of thought the human discerns it!'elf seeing

itself beyond itself. And if Frost is correct, it sees "something
white, uncertain, something more of the depth." Not only do we
humans think "the beyond within," but perhaps also the "within
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beyond." What else should we do than exclaim, "For once, then,
something," whether the "something" is our self or Another? Is it
not sensible that philosophical reflection on "religion" sHould
start ther~ at the opening of the enigma? When such reflection
discerns "whatever it was lay there at bottom," even though it
were "blurred," ''blotted ... out," perhaps we can do nothing less
than suffer the thoughts that define our identity as human
beings.
For Robert Frost perception seems to allow one almost
desperately to see "something" where there may be nothing.
There may be one consolation, however paradoxical: The well
into which Frost peers has a bottom where he can catch a
glimpse of what may be there, even if only to imagine it. Still for
Frost, our longing seems to allow the mystery at least to appear
to be "something."
Another poet, Philip Larkin, allows himself not even that
much reassurance. The mystery is not "something" but in reality
is "nothing." That judgment is not as rare as believers may
suppose. Not only Marxists or existentialists are tempted to warn
those with a confidence in certain religious truths that their
minds are deluded even while held captive by hope. Larkin in his
poem "Aubade" reflects on:

The sure extinction that we travel to
And shall be lost in always. Not to be here,
Not to be anywhere,
And soon; nothing more terrible, nothing more true.

16

In Larkin's case, one of his commentators fmds that the
poet is responsive to the honesty he hears in the Blues musical
tradition.

The banning of other worldliness [by the poet] is in part
a consequence of the blues' honesty-trouble is not so
easily evaded as the church pretends-but secularism is
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also a necessary ingredient in the state of mind without
which the blues could not exist. If religion could
resolve the worry of which the bluesman sings, then the
most fundamental of the blues conventions and
attitudes would be undermined. 17
As Leggett reads "Aubade," the poet invokes a "blues" attitude
with which to confront the ordinary fears that religious
convictions presume to deny. He argues, "the method of the
poem is an honesty so plain that religion and logic seem
contrived against it." 18 He refers to "Aubade's" third stanza:

This is a spedal way ofbeing alTaid
No trick dispels. Religion used to try,
That vast moth-eaten musical brocade
Created to pretend we never die.
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For Larkin religion is not so much an illusion but more a
decoration that we create or contrive. The imagery is rare but
the sentiment is not: "That vast moth-eaten musical brocade" is
only a pretentious antique in face of Frost's "something more of
the depths." The ghost ship of religion navigates an endless sea,
discovering not even ''that whiteness" that Frost may have seen.
Even if not quite an opiate, for Larkin religion is still "The
anesthetic from which none come around."
Both poetic evocations raise doubts that religious
experience relies on an objective reality authorized by a system
of religious beliefs. Might not the philosopher take warning
from the artist that religion's promise of reasonable certainty is
at best dubious? Neither Frost nor Larkin seems willing to give
into religious belief as carrying with it any warrant of truth.
Larkin pays no heed to a definition of religion tha5 presumes
cet1ainty of belief; Frost, with some reluctance, at least allows
that the mind might entertain the mystery-which may or may
not be a gesture toward affirming what we may normally think
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of as religious belief. Is there no way to grasp religious
experience other than as a response to historical conventions that
seem to defme religion once for all as insisting that oui only
option is..to "believe the unbelievable"?
It is tempting to respond to this dilemma with
conventional reason or dogmatic science as defining the limits of
human experience.
If we refuse to locate religion on the
"human continuum," where does the rational imagination go?
We are left only with the radical certainty of uncertainty. How
then to appreciate the persistence of human religion in refusing
surrender to a vision of a flat world devoid of authentic mystery
and wonder-and its insistence in asking the question, "Is that all
there is?" Even Bryan Magee seems unable-or certainly
unwilling-to settle for such a loss.
While tracking Bryan Magee through his philosophical
confessions, two insights broke the surface for me. Magee was
lamenting the fact that Tolstoy, when he decided that philosophy
would yield "no ultimate answers," despaired of philosophy and
embraced religion.
Magee then tries to justifY his
disappointment with the great artist:
If even the crabbed skeptics admit that the statements
of religion cannot be confuted by reason, why should I
not believe in them, since they have so much on their
side-tradition, the concurrence of mankind, and all the
consolation they yield? Yes, why not? But do not
deceive yourself into thinking that with such
arguments you are following the path of correct
reasoning. If ever there was a case of facile argument,
this is one. Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe
anything is derived from it. 20

Magee picks up the cudgel again and wields it more
precisely:
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And that is the point: If we do not know, we do not
know. Any talk about this opening up the way for faith
is a dangerous playing with words. Ignorance is no
justification for believing anything. 21
May I entreat my reader to hear that last statement-but by
shifting the emphasis within the proposition? For example,
"Ignorance is no justification for believing anything." ''Ignorance
is no justification for believing anything." "Ignorance is no
justification for believing anything." And so forth, from first
word to last and for combinations as well.
As we draw closer to a broad and appreciative perspective
on "religion," I shall argue that the most elemental religious
experience is in fact not to be identified with belief-as it usually
is in many of its invocations. Again Magee allows another
insight to surface. He is discussing Heidegger's concept of the
self:

At the heart of the mystery [of the non-objective sel:(], it
seems to me, must lie the relationship between the self
and the empirical world in which it is not an object. In
fact I am tempted to believe that the ultimate mystery
is the relationship between the self and the empirical
world. 22
I shall grant Magee his right "to believe" what he wants
to. After all, perhaps the assertion of such a belief is little more
than a convenient rhetorical gesture. But the insight is so
compelling that I am inclined to ~inker ever so carefully with his
statement. I would prefer to locate the "ultimate mystery" in the
selfs experience of its relationship with the empirical world. It
would be interesting indeed to confront Frost and especially
Larkin with such a judgment.
In the next chapter, I shall test the po~ibility of
(re)defining "religion" in experiential terms rather than accept
the interpretive paradigm that presents "religion" as captured by
or expressed in simple utterances of belief. I trust that, so far, I
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have set the stage for philosophical reflections that avoid that
quite limited way of understanding a phenomenon that is
historical and psychological, and at the same time alludes to the
possibili~of transcending the very empirical world in which it is
firmly planted.
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